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Abstract
This letter discusses the problem of testing the degree of randomness within an image, particularly for
a shuffled or encrypted image. Its key contributions are: 1) a mathematical model of perfectly shuffled
images; 2) the derivation of the theoretical distribution of pixel differences; 3) a new Z-test based
approach to differentiate whether or not a test image is perfectly shuffled; and 4) a randomized algorithm
to unbiasedly evaluate the degree of randomness within a given image. Simulation results show that the
proposed method is robust and effective in evaluating the degree of randomness within an image, and
may often be more suitable for image applications than commonly used testing schemes designed for
binary data like NIST 800-22. The developed method may be also useful as a first step in determining
whether or not a shuffling or encryption scheme is suitable for a particular cryptographic application.
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently digital images are a major information resource in real life. A large amount of digital images
are private, sensitive, or even classified. Much research has been done to ensure security during image
transmission or storage. Two typical protection methods are image shuffling (IS) [1] and image encryption
(IE) [2], [3], where IS only scrambles pixel positions, while IE changes both pixel positions and values.
Regardless of the technical details of a protection method, a key question that need to be answered is
‘Is this method secure?’. Unfortunately, this raises a dilemma: if a method is secure, then it must be
invulnerable to all attacks; however, it is impossible to list all existing but unknown attacks, or those will
be developed in the future. Thus, all we can do is to test whether it is secure under our known attacks.
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2Among various attacks, one family is statistical attacks [4], which take advantage of leaked infor-
mation from poorly protected images. This leaked information always exists, unless a protected image
is indistinguishable from a random one. Therefore, the indistinguishability from a random image is a
necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a secure protection method, and evaluating the degree of
randomness becomes a prerequisite. For example, FIPS 140-2 tests [5] and NIST 800-22 test suite [6]
are suggested for cryptographic applications. However, they are merely designed for one-dimensional
(1D) data encryption (DE), quite different from two-dimensional (2D) IS or IE. For instance, DE expects
random 0s and 1s that are independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) with equal probabilities. IS leads to
a pixel distribution identical to that of the original image, and thus can be arbitrary. IE should lead to a
uniform distribution, but it is unclear that how to tailor pixels from a 2D image into a 1D bit sequence,
so that DE evaluation tools can be properly applied. Thus, additional randomness evaluation tools for
images need to be developed.
Although some evaluation methods (EM) have been presented, the following four serious challenges
still should be considered (summarized from [7]): 1) pixel values and positions should be both considered;
2) the randomness degree should effectively reflect the relationship between a shuffled image and the
corresponding method; 3) the evaluation should be dependent only on a test image; and 4) the method
complexity should be independent of a test image. However, so far an effective approach does not exist [8].
Existing EMs for IS and IE can be classified into two groups: subjective methods and objective methods.
The former group commonly uses empirical knowledge to quantify the randomness of a shuffled or
encrypted image [9], [7], [10], while the latter group tests the image randomness with respect to derived
statistics [11], [12], [13]. The use of pixel differences for image randomness has been explored for
a long time [9], [7], [10], but these heuristic, subjective methods allow only quantitative evaluations.
Nevertheless, all these mentioned methods are either for IS or IE, but not both of them.
In this letter, we propose a new quality EM for both IS and IE using pixel differences, which solves
all four mentioned challenges. The rest of the letter is organized as: Sec. II studies the perfectly shuffled
image model; Sec. III constructs hypothesis tests for our randomness EM; Sec. IV discusses a special
case for IE; Sec. V provides simulation results; and a summary of the paper with conclusions is given
in Sec. VI.
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3II. PERFECTLY SHUFFLED IMAGES
A. What Is a Perfectly Shuffled Image?
Before developing a randomness EM, one has to answer the question ‘what is a perfectly shuffled
image?’. Altough there are other answers, we believe it is the one with the properties that 1) all neighbor
pixels are independent and 2) only random-like patterns exist within the image. This means that pixels
in a perfectly shuffled image are i.i.d. just as a random image. Thus, a perfectly shuffled image can be
defined as:
Definition 1: (A Perfectly Shuffled Image) An L-intensity scale image X={xl}l∈Ω on a 2D domain Ω
with a pixel distribution P=[p0, p1, · · ·, pL−1] (
∑L−1
k=0 pk = 1) is called perfectly shuffled, if each pixel is
i.i.d. with distribution P , where pk is the probability of seeing a pixel at the kth scale in X and δ(.) is
the Kronecker delta function with 1 at 0 and 0 elsewhere.
pk =
∑
l∈Ω δ(xl − k)/|Ω| (1)
B. Theoretical Statistics
Theorem 1. If image X is perfectly shuffled, then the pixel difference ρlk=|xl−xk| between two arbitrary
distinctive pixels xl and xk with l, k∈Ω and l 6=k satisfy the distribution
Pd = Pr(ρlk=d)=

∑L−1
k=0 p
2
k , if d = 0
2
∑L−1
k=d pk−dpk , if d∈ [1, L−1]
. (2)
Proof: Firstly, compute the probability for d = 0
Pr(ρlk = 0) = Pr(xl = xk) =
∑L−1
k=0 Pr(xl = xk|xk)Pr(xk)
i.i.d.
=
∑L−1
k=0 pkpk =
∑L−1
k=0 p
2
k.
Secondly, for arbitrary difference d 6= 0, we have
Pr(ρlk = d) = Pr(xl = xk + d) + Pr(xl = xk − d)
=
∑L−1−d
k=0 Pr(xl=xk+d|xk)Pr(xk)
+
∑L−1
k=d Pr(xl=xk−d|xk)Pr(xk)
i.i.d.
=
∑L−1−d
k=0 pk+dpk +
∑L−1
k=d pk−dpk
= 2
∑L−1
k=d pk−dpk
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4Finally, it is noticeable that
∑L−1
d=0 Pr(ρlk = d) =
∑L−1
k=0 p
2
k + 2
∑L−1
d=1
∑L−1
k=d pk−dpk
=(
∑L−1
k=0 pk)
2 = 12 = 1
is indeed a discrete probability distribution. 
Remark. 1) The distribution (2) is image dependent, because P is image dependent. 2) P can be obtained
from a shuffled image directly, because P doesnot change before and after IS.
Theorem 2. Let ρm =
∑m
i=1 ρli,ki/m be the average of the differences for m pairs pixels with m≥30
and ∪mi=1li ∩ ∪mi=1ki = ∅. Then ρm follows the Normal distribution
ρm ∼ N (µ, σ2/m) (3)
with the mean and variance as
µ =
∑L−1
d=0 dPd and σ
2 =
∑L−1
d=0 d
2Pd − µ2. (4)
Proof: Straight-forward by using the central limit theorem for i.i.d. ρlikis following distribution (2). 
III. EVALUATING IMAGE SHUFFLING RANDOMNESS USING PIXEL DIFFERENCES
A. Hypothesis Tests for Perfectly Shuffled Images
Knowing the theoretical distribution of ρm, we are able to construct hypothesis tests for IS. In particular,
we can test image randomness by comparing the theoretical average with the sample average pixel
difference of m pairs pixels as follows:
H0: Null hypothesis that image Y is indistinguishable from a perfectly shuffled image X, i.e. ρ˜m =
ρm.
H1: Alternative hypothesis that ρ˜m 6= ρm.
where ρ˜m =
∑m
i=1 |yli − yki |/m and ∪mi=1li ∩ ∪mi=1ki = ∅.
Since ρm∼N (µ, σ2/m), this hypothesis test is a Z-test, where the test statistic can be constructed as
z =
ρ˜m − µ
σ/
√
m
and z ∼ N (0, 1). (5)
Therefore, given a significance level α, we can compute the critical values under the null hypothesis as
ρ˜m
∗− = µ+ Φ−1α/2σ/
√
m and ρ˜m
∗+ = µ− Φ−1α/2σ/
√
m (6)
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5where Φ−1. is the inverse cumulative distribution function of the standard Gaussian N (0, 1). If the sample
average ρ˜m /∈ [ρ˜m∗−, ρ˜m∗+], we reject the null hypothesis and claim Y is distinguishable from a perfectly
shuffled image.
B. A New Image Shuffling Quality Evaluation Method
It is noticeable that the proposed hypothesis tests are valid for m pairs of pixels regardless of their
spatial configuration, e.g. horizontal neighbor pixels, adjacent image blocks etc. In practice, however,
we have to unbiasedly test pixels with all possible spatial configurations. Otherwise, we cannot fairly
quantify the degree of randomness. One solution is to use the randomized algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 (α,N,m, T ) Pixel Difference Test for IS
Require: Y is a L intensity scale image and α is the significance level
Require: N=# of tests, m =# pixel pairs and T= # of evaluation times
Ensure: r is the success rate for pixels in Y passing the hypothesis test.
1: Find sample intensity distribution P={pk}k∈[0,L−1] for image Y using (1)
2: Compute the pixel difference distribution Pr(ρ)={Pd}d∈[0,L−1] using (2)
3: Compute the mean µ and variance σ2 using (4)
4: Compute critical values ρ˜m∗− and ρ˜m∗+ using (6)
5: for t = 1 to T do
6: Initialize rt = 0
7: for i = 1 to N do
8: Pull m pairs of image pixels with a random configuration w\o repetitions
Ybl={yl1 , · · · , ylm} and Ybk={yk1 , · · · , ykm}.
9: Compute ρ˜m=
∑m
i=1 |yli − yki |/m
10: if ρ˜m ∈ [ρ˜m∗−, ρ˜m∗+] then
11: rt++
12: end if
13: end for
14: end for
15: r = maxt∈[1,T ]{rt}/N .
Algorithm 1 considers both pixel values and positions, reflects the randomness within a test image,
relies only on a test image and has a constant complexity O(NTm). Therefore, it successfully solves all
four challenges specified in [7].
Assume Y is perfectly shuffled. The four parameters in Algorithm 1 have the following impacts.
Parameter α is close related to the pass times rt, whose mean and variance are
E[rt] = (1−α)N and E[(rt−E[rt])2]=Nα(1−α). (7)
Parameter N influences the number of spatial configurations and also the number of pixels used in the
evaluation. Thus, a larger N implies a more fair evaluation.
Parameter m has two related effects: 1) the larger m is, the smaller the variance σ2/m is in (3); 2)
the larger the m is, the poorer the localization of the test. The former effect prefers a large m to attain
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6a small variance, while the latter one prefers a small m to test a local pixel configuration. Therefore,
an optimal m∗ should be the one balancing both effects. To do so, we define the loss function (8) for
m, where term σ2/m reflects the loss in the test accuracy, term m2/|Ω| reflects the loss in localization
capacity, and λ is the coefficient indicating the relative importance of the two types of loss.
Ψ(m) = σ2/m+ λm2/|Ω| (8)
Hence, the optimal m∗ minimizes the loss function Ψ(m)
m∗ = arg minm∈[1,|Ω|] Ψ(m) (9)
and is of the form (10), where d·e is the integer rounding function towards infinity.
m∗ = d 3
√
σ2|Ω|/(2λ)e (10)
Finally, parameter T plays an important role to reduce the type I error (false positive error) of the
evaluation. As T→∞, the type I error goes to zero.
lim
T→∞
Pr(r<1−α|H0)= lim
T→∞
Pr(maxt∈[1,T ]{rt}< E[rt]|H0) =
∏T→∞
t=1 Pr(rt<E[rt]|H0)=0 (11)
IV. SPECIAL CASE FOR IMAGE ENCRYPTION
Because ideally an encrypted image is random-like with a uniform pixel distribution [11], [12], the
derived statistics, hypothesis tests, and the proposed EM are also applicable to IE, by simply using
P=U [0, L− 1] (i.e. pk = 1/L in (1)).
Specifically, the pixel difference distribution for perfectly encrypted images follows the triangular
distribution (12) and the corresponding average pixel difference for m pair pixels ρem follows the Normal
distribution ρem∼N (µe, σ2e/m).
Pre(ρlk=d)=
 1/L, if d = 02(L− d)/L2 , if d∈ [1, L−1] (12)
µe=(L
2−1)/(3L) andσ2e =(L2−1)(L2+2)/(18L2) (13)
Table I gives the theoretical numerical results of µe and σe under various image types, where L =2,
256 and 65536 refer to the binary image, 8-bit grayscale image and 16-bit grayscale image, respectively.
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7The critical values of the hypothesis tests can be computed as
ρ˜em
∗−
= µe + Φ
−1
α/2
σe√
m∗e
and ρ˜em
∗+
= µe − Φ−1α/2
σe√
m∗e
(14)
where m∗e is the optimal number of independent pixel pairs used in the quality measure and can be
computed via (10).
TABLE I: Pixel Differences Statistics in Perfectly Encrypted Images
Image Intensity Levels L
Stat. 2 256 65536
µe 0.500 85.332 21845.333
σe 0.500 60.340 15446.983
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We apply the proposed randomness EM (Algorithm 1) for IS and IE to real data. All following
experiments are done under the MATLAB r2012a environment. Test images are square size 8-bit grayscale
(i.e. L=256) from the USC-SIPI miscellaneous dataset (detail descriptions are available online 1).
The parameters N , α and T in Algorithm 1 are set to 1000, 0.05, and 10 respectively. Parameter m is
optimized with respect to each test image with λ = µ/L for IS and λ = µe/L for IE. Related statistics
for performing the quality evaluation are given in Table II, where the critical values are computed with
respect to α=.05.
Under these parameter settings, it is noticeable that
Pr(rt < E[rt]|H0)=
∑949
s=0
(
1000
s
)
.95s.051000−s= .4625
and thus
Pr(r<1−α|H0) = .462510<5/10000
indicating a very small type I error of the evaluation method.
Tested IS methods are the random permutation method (RPM) [1], row and column shuffling (RCS)
[14], Arnold transform method (ATM) [2], and Sudoku shuffling (SS) [15]. Meanwhile, we also use the
IE methods including the logistic map encryption (LME) [16], the AES cipher [3] with the electronic
codebook (ECB) mode and the cipher-block chaining (CBC) mode, respectively. It is worthy to point
out that the RPM and the AES-CBC are classic methods for IS and IE, respectively. Therefore, it is not
1is available under the page http://sipi.usc.edu/database/database.php?volume=misc as of 10/22/2012.
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8TABLE II: Statistics of Pixel Differences for Test Images
Image Info. Stat. for IS Stat. for IE
Name Side µ σ m∗ ρ˜m∗∗± µe σe m∗e ρ˜m∗e
∗±
5.1.09 256 29.58 25.76 574 27.47∼31.69 85.33 60.34 711 80.90∼89.77
5.1.10 256 51.54 38.15 619 48.53∼54.54 85.33 60.34 711 80.90∼89.77
5.1.11 256 33.82 32.31 638 31.31∼36.33 85.33 60.34 711 80.90∼89.77
5.1.12 256 58.51 55.96 766 54.54∼62.47 85.33 60.34 711 80.90∼89.77
5.1.13 256 51.24 94.08 1132 45.76∼56.72 85.33 60.34 711 80.90∼89.77
5.1.14 256 47.60 36.37 616 44.73∼50.47 85.33 60.34 711 80.90∼89.77
5.2.08 512 43.75 35.99 998 41.52∼45.98 85.33 60.34 1128 81.81∼88.85
5.2.09 512 40.58 38.27 1066 38.29∼42.88 85.33 60.34 1128 81.81∼88.85
5.2.10 512 61.91 46.46 1054 59.11∼64.72 85.33 60.34 1128 81.81∼88.85
5.3.01 1024 66.54 47.79 1664 64.24∼68.84 85.33 60.34 1790 82.54∼88.13
5.3.02 1024 37.88 32.88 1565 36.25∼39.51 85.33 60.34 1790 82.54∼88.13
7.1.01 512 29.48 24.41 879 27.87∼31.10 85.33 60.34 1128 81.81∼88.85
7.1.02 512 17.00 26.26 1109 15.46∼18.55 85.33 60.34 1128 81.81∼88.85
7.1.03 512 27.98 26.10 935 26.31∼29.65 85.33 60.34 1128 81.81∼88.85
7.1.04 512 36.38 33.02 1002 34.34∼38.43 85.33 60.34 1128 81.81∼88.85
7.1.05 512 39.71 29.46 902 37.79∼41.64 85.33 60.34 1128 81.81∼88.85
7.1.06 512 37.93 27.97 885 36.09∼39.77 85.33 60.34 1128 81.81∼88.85
7.1.07 512 26.19 21.92 851 24.72∼27.66 85.33 60.34 1128 81.81∼88.85
7.1.08 512 21.85 26.18 1018 20.24∼23.45 85.33 60.34 1128 81.81∼88.85
7.1.09 512 40.67 30.50 916 38.70∼42.65 85.33 60.34 1128 81.81∼88.85
7.1.10 512 29.12 24.38 882 27.51∼30.73 85.33 60.34 1128 81.81∼88.85
7.2.01 1024 21.27 29.33 1758 19.89∼22.64 85.33 60.34 1790 82.54∼88.13
boat.512 512 49.85 43.27 1081 47.27∼52.43 85.33 60.34 1128 81.81∼88.85
elaine.512 512 52.65 38.35 979 50.25∼55.05 85.33 60.34 1128 81.81∼88.85
gray21.512 512 88.72 62.95 1145 85.07∼92.36 85.33 60.34 1128 81.81∼88.85
numbers.512 512 70.28 51.91 1088 67.19∼73.36 85.33 60.34 1128 81.81∼88.85
ruler.512 512 49.94 101.20 1902 45.40∼54.49 85.33 60.34 1128 81.81∼88.85
testpat.1k 1024 85.28 64.98 1881 82.35∼88.22 85.33 60.34 1790 82.54∼88.13
surprising to see good performance scores for these two methods. In contrast, the RCS and ATM are
known to have mesh-like and slant patterns, respectively. Thus we shall expect to see low scores for these
two methods. The AES-ECB method is known to be insecure for patterned images, because it cannot
encrypt two identical blocks to different random patterns with the same key.
Evaluation results for these methods are listed in Table III. As one can see, RPM and AES-CBC
have their evaluation scores all above 1-α=.95. In contrast, none of evaluation scores for the RCS and
ATM is above .95 (emphasized by underlines), indicating that one can distinguish their shuffled images
from those perfectly shuffled. The scores for these two methods vary greatly for different test images,
especially for the ATM, whose IS performance is known to be related to the period of a random Arnold
transform. The AES-EBC has good scores for most images but bad scores for highly structured images
like ruler.512 and testpat.1k. The SS and LME both have good evaluation scores above .95 indicating that
their shuffled or encrypted images are indistinguishable from random-like. Fig. 1 gives sample results
of these methods. Once again, the indistinguishability of shuffled or encrypted images from random-like
ones are only a necessary condition for a method to be secure. All these results are sufficient to conclude
the methods RCS, ATM and ECB are insecure.
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Original IS IE
Test Image RPM RCS ATM SS CBC ECB LME
5.1.09 479 960 904 489 959 960 964 959
5.1.10 894 957 937 918 959 961 960 960
5.1.11 223 960 835 210 960 957 957 956
5.1.12 271 961 836 272 962 957 961 956
5.1.13 871 961 898 908 957 960 489 955
5.1.14 695 960 905 720 960 958 955 959
5.2.08 668 958 836 673 960 964 964 965
5.2.09 877 960 952 928 959 965 952 956
5.2.10 340 955 889 526 962 964 963 950
5.3.01 387 957 937 418 958 960 962 957
5.3.02 603 958 943 649 961 959 957 962
7.1.01 472 958 934 503 958 961 965 961
7.1.02 354 968 936 354 965 961 963 966
7.1.03 433 957 910 470 966 957 961 964
7.1.04 460 960 915 509 958 964 964 964
7.1.05 759 959 920 789 957 956 962 959
7.1.06 681 961 937 715 961 959 958 956
7.1.07 804 955 939 844 961 971 969 969
7.1.08 560 959 896 525 964 956 951 966
7.1.09 116 963 864 113 961 960 956 961
7.1.10 650 957 913 662 959 962 960 961
7.2.01 598 958 929 668 963 961 954 953
boat.512 302 957 843 319 958 956 960 957
elaine.512 499 963 936 594 961 959 956 956
gray21.512 62 956 852 71 955 960 567 970
numbers.512 707 961 916 777 958 965 967 962
ruler.512 531 962 801 701 958 959 299 961
testpat.1k 222 957 894 269 959 957 628 956
Mean 518.5 959.2 900.3 556.9 960.0 960.3 893.7 959.9
Standard Deviation 229.8 2.8 40.9 239.5 2.5 3.4 172.2 4.8
VI. CONCLUSION
We introduced a new randomness (quality) evaluation method for IS. It tests whether an image is
indistinguishable from a perfectly shuffled one, whose image pixels are i.i.d. everywhere. The proposed
method can be used as a prerequisite test to claim an IS or IE method is secure. Simulation results
indicate that this method is accurate and effective for quality evaluation for IS and IE methods. Moreover,
it can be used as an indicator of quality control. That is, if a shuffled or encrypted image fails to
reach the expected evaluation score, it should be re-shuffled or encrypted using another key. Further, the
developed method may be useful as a first step in determining whether or not an IE scheme is suitable
for a particular cryptographic application. The proposed method is of a constant complexity and can be
easily implemented. Thus, it is well suited for practical applications. A MATLAB implementation can
be provided on request.
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(a1) numbers.RPM (b1) numbers.RCS (c1) numbers.ATM (d1) numbers.SS
(e1) Original image: numbers.512 (f1) numbers.CBC (g1) numbers.ECB (h1) numbers.LME
(a2) ruler.RPM (b2) ruler.RCS (c2) ruler.ATM (d2) ruler.SS
(e2) Original image: ruler.512 (f2) ruler.CBC (g2) ruler.ECB (h2) ruler.LME
Fig. 1: Shuffled and encrypted images
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